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Combining weekly productivity data with weekly productivity beliefs for a large
sample of truckers over 2 years, we show that workers tend to systematically
and persistently overpredict their productivity. If workers are overconfident about
their own productivity at the current firm relative to their outside option, they
should be less likely to quit. Empirically, all else equal, having higher productivity beliefs is associated with an employee being less likely to quit. To study the
implications of overconfidence for worker welfare and firm profits, we estimate a
structural learning model with biased beliefs that accounts for many key features
of the data. While worker overconfidence moderately decreases worker welfare, it
also substantially increases firm profits.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Scholars have long argued that people have a tendency to be overconfident about their
ability (see, e.g., Adam Smith's The Wealth ofNations). Decades of research in psychology
(and growing research in economics) support the idea that people are overconfident.
However, much of this research is based on short-term student lab experiments. Much
less is known about overconfidence in the field (especially over time) and even less so
in the context of employee productivity in the workplace. 1 Are workers overconfident
about their productivity in an actual workplace setting? Is overconfidence persistent or
does it quickly disappear over time due to learning? What are the implications of worker
overconfidence for employee behavior, employee welfare, and the profits of firms?
We address these questions using unique data from the trucking industry. While it
is one industry, trucking is well suited for our analysis because productivity (weekly
miles driven) is easily measured and because the industry is large (see Section 2). At
a leading trucking firm (which we call Firm A), 895 newly trained workers were asked to
predict their weekly productivity for 2 years. We show that workers who expect higher
productivity end up achieving higher productivity, so subjective beliefs are predictive.
However, the data also reveal a pattern where workers tend to systematically overpredict their productivity. Overprediction is very persistent. Average overprediction does
eventually decline, but only very slowly. The overprediction we observe without financial incentives remains even when belief-elicitation is made incentive-compatible using
randomized financial incentives for accurate prediction at a second large trucking firm
(Firm B). We refer to this overprediction as "overconfidence" and say more about the
term below.
Having documented this overprediction, we next seek to model it quantitatively, as
well as to understand its implications. We turn to Jovanovic 's (1979) canonical model
of turnover, where quitting decisions reflect the evolution of worker beliefs about job
match or productivity. We document that, consistent with theory, workers who expect
higher productivity are less likely to quit. From the standpoint of the firm, this may
be especially important in our context because the firm is providing the workers with
firm-sponsored general training at no direct cost. Worker turnover is costly for the firm,
1 Some exceptions in economics on overconfidence in the field include the work on overconfident CEOs
pioneered by Malmendier and Tate (2005), as well as Hoffman (2016), who studied how overconfidence affects businesspeople's demand for information; Wang (2014), who studied loan officers, accommodating biased beliefs in screening ability using a structural model; and work on overconfident investors (e.g., Barber
and Odean (2001)) . Outside of economics, there are various studies that examine overconfidence among
particular workers, for example, Baumann, Deber, and Thompson (199 1) studied doctors and nurses. However, studies like Baumann, Deber, and Thompson (1 99 1) often measure beliefs only once and often consider hypothetical situations/vignettes or trivia questions instead of predicting productivity. Meikle, Tenney, and Moore (2016) reviewed work on overconfidence and organizations. To our knowledge, very few
studies analyze overconfidence at high frequencies over substantial periods of time (e.g., > 3 months). An
exception is a psychology study by Massey, Simmons, and Armor (2011), who show that football fans persistently overpredict the chance of their favorite team winning over 4 months. Other papers study forms of
biased beliefs over long time horizons, but at lower frequencies, for example, quarterly (Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013)) .
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Worker overconfidence 3 17

leading the firm to lose the individuals that they recently provided training to. While potentially useful for firms, if workers are overconfident about their ability at the firm relative to their outside option, this may distort worker quitting decisions, reducing worker
welfare.
To evaluate the importance of overconfidence for worker welfare and firm profits,
we develop a structural model of worker turnover. Similar to Jovanovic (1 979), workers
learn about their underlying productivity through weekly productivity realizations, and
decide when, if ever, to quit. However, we do not impose that workers are fully rational.
Workers may hold biased priors, or learn faster or slower than predicted by Bayes' rule,
n esting the standard model as a special case. Using our rich subjective belief data for
identification, we estimate that workers have mean bias of about one-third of underlying productivity, as well as substantial variance bias, with learning much slower than
predicted by Bayes' rule. Our model fits the data quite well, whereas a standard model
performs far worse. In a counterfactual simulation, we show that eliminating worker
overconfidence would moderately increase worker welfare (because workers make better decisions), but would substantially reduce firm profits.
Our study makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we provide longterm high-frequency field evidence on overconfidence, some of the longest highfrequency evidence in any field (psychology or economics). 2 Moore and Healy (2008)
provided an excellent survey of recent work and divide overconfidence into three types:
relative overconfidence (thinking you are better than others), absolute overconfidence
(thinking you are better than you actually are), and over-precision (thinking your beliefs are more precise than they actually are) . Our paper's largest focus is on absolute
overconfidence, which we refer to hereafter simply as overconfidence. Much of overconfidence research studies short- term laboratory tasks, for example, trivia games. This
paper analyzes overconfidence using weekly data over 2 years on forecasts about individual productivity in an actual work setting.
Second, we quantify the worker welfare impacts of overconfidence by developing
a structural learning model with biased beliefs. We present one of the first papers in
economics to estimate a learning model with biased beliefs. 3 More generally, we con2 To our knowledge, our study provided the longest high-frequency field evidence in the literature when it
first appeared. In recent work by psychologists, Moore et al. (2016) studied a geopolitical forecasting tournament, where people participated for up to 3 years, building on earlier work on political forecasting (Tetlock
(2005)) . Moore et al. (2016) found a small but persistent degree of overconfidence. Our study differs in that
it examines workplace productivity (instead of geopolitics), it studies implications of overconfidence, and
it models overconfidence using a structural model.
3 While several recent papers in labor and personnel economics analyze learning using a structural ap proach (e.g., Arcidiacono (2004), Bojilov (2017), Sanders (2016), Stange (2012)), we allow for both generalized and nonrational learning. Two papers in industrial organization, Goettler and Clay (2011) and Grubb
and Osborne (2015), estimate biased learning models of plan choice for online groceries and cell phone
service, respectively. A main difference in our paper is that belief biases are identified using high- freq uency
subj ective belief data, whereas in Goettler and Clay (2011) and Grubb and Osborne (2015), biases are identified thro ugh contractu al choices. There are advantages of each approach . An advantage of using contracts
relative to using subjective beliefs is that economists are more trusting of "what people do" compared to
"what people say." A virtue of using beliefs is that repeated suboptimal ex post contractual choices may
reflect factors oth er than biased beliefs, including inertia or switching costs.
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tribute to a small but growing literature using subjective beliefs in various ways to estimate structural models (for pioneer papers, see, e.g., Bellemare, Kroger, and van Soest
(2008), Chan, Hamilton, and Makler (2008), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008)). 4
Third, we show that worker overconfidence can significantly enhance firm profits.
Counterfactual simulations suggest that biased beliefs are quantitatively important for
firms; in particular, training would be substantially less profitable if workers were not
overconfident. While a number of field studies analyze how firms may benefit from consumer biases (see Koszegi (2014) for a survey), ours is one of the first field studies to
analyze how firms may benefit from biases of their workers. 5
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives background on trucking and describes
the data. Section 3 analyzes subjective productivity belief data, both from Firm A (without incentives) and from Firm B (with randomized financial incentives). Section 4 develops the model and structurally estimates it. Section 5 performs the counterfactual simulations. Section 6 concludes. For brevity in typesetting, Appendices D-F appear in the
Online Supplementary Material (Hoffman and Burks (2020)). A complete version of the
Online Supplemental Material (Hoffman and Burks (2020)) containing all Appendices
(A-G) and the Appendix References appears within the replication package.
2.

BACKGROUND AND DATA

2.1 Institutional background

Truck driving in the US Truck driving is a large occupation, with roughly 1.8 million US
workers operating heavy trucks such as those used by the firms we study (BLS (2010)).
Firms A and Bare in the long-distance truckload segment of the for-hire trucking industry, which is the largest employment setting for this occupation. An important distinction is between long-haul and short-haul trucking. Long-haul truckload drivers are usually paid by the mile (a piece rate) (Belzer (2000)) and drive long distances from home.
In contrast, short-haul truckload drivers generally spend fewer nights away from home
and are often not paid by the mile. 6
The main training for heavy truck drivers is that needed to obtain a commercial
driver's license (CDL). Most new drivers take a formal CDL training course, and in some
states it is required by law (BLS (2010)). CDL training can be obtained at truck driving
schools run by trucking companies, at private truck driving schools, and at some community colleges. At Firm A, the CDL training drivers received went for about 2-3 weeks,
4 See Arcidiacono

et al. (2014) and Wiswall and Zafar (2015) for examples of recent papers. van der Klaauw

(2012) discussed incorporating subjective beliefs into dynamic structural models. AppendixA.13 describes

additional papers.
5 0tto (2014) and Humphery-Jenner et al. (2016) studied empirically how executive overconfidence interacts with compensation structure.
6 We highlight a few more institutional details. Truckload is the segment that hauls full trailer loads.
Truckload has a high employee turnover rate, often over 100% per year at large firms (Burks et al. (2008)), as
well as low unionization, and most drivers do not own their own trucks. About 10% of trucks in 1992 were
driven by drivers who own their own truck (owner-operators), with the remaining share driven by company drivers, i.e., workers driving company-owned trucks (Baker and Hubbard (2004)) . The drivers that we
analyze are nonunion company drivers. For an analysis of productivity in trucking, see Hubbard (2003) .
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Worker overconfidence 3 19

and included classroom lectures, simulator driving, and actual behind-the-wheel truck
driving. The market price for CDL training at private training schools varies, but is often
several thousand dollars.
The Firm A drivers we study in this paper received training under a 12-month training contract. Under this contract, Firm A paid for the training and in return the driver
committed to stay with the firm for a year. If the driver left early, they were fined between $3500 and $4000. Drivers did not post a bond, and the firm seemed to collect only
about 30% of the penalties owed (despite the firm making strenuous efforts to collect the
penalties owed); further details on the contracts are provided in another paper (Hoffman
and Burks (2017)), which studies the contracts in detail. 7

Production Truckload drivers haul full loads between a wide variety oflocations. While
the data do not include driver hours, drivers are constrained by the federal legal limit of
about 60 hrs/week, and we were informed by managers that workers often work hours
up to the federal limit. Firm A loads are assigned via a central dispatching system. As signment of loads to drivers is done primarily based on proximity (as well as hours left
up to the federal limit). Once a load is finished, a driver may start a new one.
Productivity in long-haul trucking is measured in miles per week. There are significant cross-driver differences in average productivity, as well as substantial idiosyncratic
variation in productivity within drivers. Asked about the reasons for the sizable crossdriver productivity differences, managers described various factors including driver
speed, ability to avoid traffic, avoiding getting lost, route planning (miles are calculated
according to a prespecified distance between two points, not by distance traveled), and
coordinating with others regarding unloading the truck. As an example, if a driver arrives late, they may need to wait around in order to have their truck unloaded, and this
could negatively affect miles per week. Regarding sources of week-to-week variation,
managers emphasized weather, traffic, variable time for loading/unloading, and disadvantageous assignments of loads. Thus, weekly miles, our measure of productivity, re flect driver performance and effort, as well as factors that workers do not control and
may be difficult to predict ex ante. See Appendix G for more on measuring productivity.
2.2 Firm A data

Data information To create our dataset, we collected subjective beliefs about next
week's productivity for a subset of 895 new drivers trained at one of the firm's training
schools in late 2005-2006. Beyond the productivity beliefs survey, drivers did various
tests (e.g., IQ, personality) during training, and were invited to do other surveys during
their first 2 years of work (see Appendix A. l). We will sometimes refer to drivers in our
data as the "data subset," 8 and several other papers by the author(s) analyze this sub-
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7 The Appendix of Hoffman and Burks (2017) explains how it is common for large truckload firms to
provide CDL training.
8 We use the term "data subset" to distinguish it from the full sample of drivers at Firm A (for whom there
is regular personnel data, but no beliefs data) who are studied in Hoffman and Burks (2017) and Burks et al.

(2015).
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set of drivers in other work. 9 However, the productivity belief data we collect have never
been analyzed previously. Records from the firm provide weekly data on miles and earnings, and we also have worker demographic information.
Every week around Tuesday, 10 drivers in the data subset were asked to predict their
miles for the following pay week (Sunday-Saturday, starting on the Sunday in 5 days) .
This occurred for up to roughly 2 years, with some variation in maximum weeks depending on when drivers started. Drivers responded by typing an answer to the below
question, which we sent over the truck's computer system: About how many paid miles
do you expect to run during your next pay week? We interpret this question as asking
drivers for their subjective mean. 11 There are several potential concerns with using our
beliefs question to predict behavior and study overconfidence:
1. Researchers might worry that beliefs are stated to please others, for example,
drivers exaggerate their productivity beliefs to please their boss. However, in our setting,
drivers were informed repeatedly that their responses and participation were never to be
shared with the company. That is, driver supervisors would never even know whether a
worker participated in the survey, let alone what his responses were.

2. No incentives were used to incentivize accurate belief responses. However, as we
discuss below in our field experiment with Firm B (see Section 3.2), we find no evidence
that beliefs are different when workers are rewarded for accurate beliefs.
3. There is substantial nonresponse: the average response rate to the weekly beliefs
survey is 28%. A 28% response rate may seem low, but is comparable to that in many
nongovernmental surveys. For example, in an influential study, Card et al. (2012) find a
response rate of20% in a survey of UC Berkeley employees. In AppendixA. l, we redo our
main structural estimation while performing inverse probability weighting (to account
for any differential selection on observed characteristics) and show that it has little impact on our estimates. We also estimate a Heckit selection model using the response
9 Appendix A.14 describes several unrelated papers using the data subset (e.g., comparing social preferences of truckers, students, and non trucker adults). Burks et al. (2013) analyze new truckers predicting their
quintile on two cognitive tests to test between different theories of relative overconfidence (people tending
to overestimate how well they do compared to other people). Our paper differs from Burks et al. (2013) in
that we study absolute overconfidence instead of relative overconfidence; we study beliefs about productivity instead of about performance on cognitive tests; and we study beliefs over time instead of at one point
in time. Also, Burks et al. (2013) is focused on testing between different theories of the causes of relative
overconfidence across people, whereas our paper focuses on the consequences of absolute overconfidence
for worker behavior and contract design. Although the papers deal with quite different issues, we view the
contributions as complementary. Burks et al. (2008) described the Firm A data collection in detail. 1069
drivers took part in data collection during training. We restrict our sample to drivers with a code denoting
no prior trucking training or experience. This leaves us with 895 first-time truckers.
10 The question was sent to drivers on Tuesday in 85 % of driver-weeks, with the remainder on nearby
days (details in Appendix A. 7).
11 Another possible interpretation is that it is asking drivers for the median of their subjective mile distribution for next week. Excluding zero mile weeks, mean and median miles are almost identical (the median of worker miles per week is 1% less than the mean miles per week). Thus, whether workers reported
their mean or median expected miles seems unlikely to matter for the reduced-form or structural estimation. See Appendix A.7 for further discussion of belief elicitation methods, as well as the issue of lumpy
beliefs/ possible rounding.
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rate to prior surveys other than the productivity beliefs survey to form an exclusion restriction. We find consistent evidence that nonresponse bias is limited and is not an important driver of our conclusions. Appendix A. l provides additional further discussion
regarding nonresponse bias.
One limitation of personnel data is we generally do not see where drivers go when
they terminate. Fortunately, we did an "exit survey" by mail for drivers in the data subset.
In drivers leaving the firm, the vast majority are not moving to long-haul trucking jobs.
Specifically, about 48% of drivers report going to a non-driving job or unemployment,
and 25% went to local driving jobs. Only 12% report moving to a long-haul trucking job,
and 15% to a regional trucking job. While the response rate on the exit survey was only
about 25 %, whether someone responds is uncorrelated with most worker characteristics
(see Appendix A.5 for more on the exit survey).

Summary statistics Panel A of Table 1 present sample means on driver characteristics.
The median data subset driver is male, white, and 35 years old. Drivers have very low
average credit scores. Of the 88% of drivers with credit scores (12% lack a sufficient credit
history to have a score), the mean and median credit scores are 586 and 564, respectively,
compared to a median of723 for the US general population at the time of data collection;
further, 53 % of drivers have a credit score below 600 (roughly, "subprime"), compared to
15% of the US population (AppendixA.4).
Panel B provides quantiles of productivity and productivity beliefs for our main sample, as well as for the sample of 699 drivers used to estimate the structural model. That
productivity beliefs exceed productivity on average is easily observed in these simple
statistics. In our estimation sample, the median productivity belief corresponds with
roughly the 75th percentile in the distribution of actual productivity.
3. REDUCED FORM ANALYSIS

In this section, we show that, while subjective beliefs are predictive about actual productivity and employee turnover, workers also exhibit a tendency to overpredict productivity. We first present our main results from about 2 years of nonincentivized belief
data from Firm A, and then present the Firm B incentivized data to show the results are
robust to incentives.
3.1 Firm A data

Predicting productivity Table 2 shows that beliefs help predict productivity beyond
other predictors. We estimate
Yi,t

= Q' + f3b i,t- l + 'Y.Yi,t- 1 + X ;,18 + Ei, t ,
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(1)

where y;,1 is driver i's productivity in his t th week with the company; b;,1_ 1 is his subjective belief about his productivity in week t stated in week t - l; .Yi,t-l is lagged average productivity to date; and X ;,1 are controls. Column 2 estimates~= 0.15, meaning,
a driver whose expectation is 100 miles higher than another driver will end up driving
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Hoffman and Burks
TABLE

1. Summary statistics.

Panel A: Driver characteristics
Variable

Mean

Female
Black
Hispanic
Age
Married
Number of kids
Years of schooling
Credit score
No credit score

0.10
0.11
0.02
36
0.41
0.96
13
586
0.12

Number of workers

895

Panel B: Productivity and productivity beliefs
Data Subset

Estimation Sample

Percentile

Miles

Miles Beliefs

Miles

Miles Beliefs

10%
25 %
50%
75 %
90%

897
1367
1883
2427
2942

1500
1800
2300
2750
3000

1019
1475
1972
2506
3005

1500
2000
2500
2800
3050

Mean

1908

2323

1998

2423

Note: Panel A provides summary statistics. The drivers in the data are from one of Firm Ns training schools and were hired
in late 2005 or 2006. Panel B presents quantiles and means on productivity and productivity beliefs, both for the data subset
(895 drivers) and for the 699 drivers with complete data that we use in the structural estimation (see Appendix DJ. For the
Estimation Sample means here, we do not restrict to the first 110 weeks, though only a small share of driver-weeks used here
( < 0.5%) are beyond 110 weeks. Summary statistics on miles are calculated restricting to weeks where miles is greater than zero.
See Appendix A.3 for more details on data and sample construction.

TABLE

2. Do productivity beliefs predict productivity? OLS regressions.

L. Predicted miles

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.194
(0.023)

0.147
(0.019)

0.072
(0.016)
0.719
(0.036)

0.068
(0.015)
0.623
(0.036)

0.080
(0.022)

No

Yes
Yes

No
No

Yes
Yes

No
No
Yes
8449
0.294

L. Avg miles to date

Demographic controls
Work type controls
Subject FE
Observations
R-squared

0
0

8449
0.070

0

8449
0.129

0

8445
0.169

0

8445
0.191
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Note: The dependent variable is miles driven per week. An observation is a driver-week. Standard errors clustered by driver
in parentheses. Demographic controls are controls for gender, race, marital status, age (dummies for 25-30, 30-35, 35-40, 40-45 ,
45-50, 50-55, 55-60, 60-80), and education (dummies for high school graduate; some college (no degree) or junior or technical
college degree; or bachelor's degree or more). Productivity is given in terms of hundreds of miles driven per week. All regressions
include week of tenure dummies. The base sample is drivers in the data subset.
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an average of 15 miles more. Once average productivity to date or driver fixed effects are
added, the coefficient drops to between abo ut 0.07 and 0.08. That is, within person, subjective beliefs have some predictive power, but less so. Overall, the results suggest that
subj ective beliefs h ave informational content, being somewhat predictive across individuals, and mildly predictive within individuals. The relatively low coefficients likely
reflect attenuation bias due to measurement error in subjective beliefs (which we account for in the structural model).

Predicting quitting Table 3 shows that quitting decisions reflect subjective beliefs outside of predictors in a standard Bayesian model. We estimate Cox proportional hazard
models of quitting of the form:
log(h;,1) = a1

+ f3b; ,1 + 'Y.Yi,t + X;,18 ,

(2)

where h; 1 is the quit hazard of driver i with t weeks of tenure and a 1 is the log baseline
hazard. Average productivity to date, ji;,1 , is a sufficient statistic for beliefs about productivity in a standard Bayesian normal learning model. However, a 100 mile increase
in subjective miles predicts a 6% decrease in the probability a worker quits. The true effects are likely higher, with observed estimates biased downward due to measurement
error. The coefficient on beliefs does not change very much as controls are added.
The finding that having higher productivity beliefs is associated with a lower chance
of quitting is robust. To show that the finding is not driven by outliers, Appendix Table El repeats Table 3 using a dummy for beliefs being above the median (as opposed
to a continuous m easure) and finds sizeable impacts. The results are broadly consistent
when we use lagged beliefs (Appendix Table E2) or a worker's average belief to date (Appendix Table E3), the latter which aims to measure beliefs more of as a stable worker
characteristic. These two checks help assuage the concern of reverse causality (e.g., one
concern is that people who expect to quit in the future might believe that they will slow
TABLE

3 . Do productivity beliefs predict quitting? Cox models.
(1 )

Predicted miles

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.081
(0.013 )

-0.118
(0.038 )

-0.057
(0.020)
-0.011
(0.034 )

-0.065
(0.021 )
-0.073
(0.041 )

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

33,374

8509

-0.059
(0.018)

Avg miles to date
Demographic controls
Work type controls
Observations

(2)

0
0

8509

0
0

8509

Yes
Yes
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8509

Note: An observation is a driver-week. Both predicted miles and average miles to date are in hundreds of miles per week.
The regressions are Cox proportional hazard models, where the failure event is quitting. Events where the driver is fired are
treated as censored. Standard errors clustered by worker in parentheses. Demographic controls are the same as in Table 2. Column 3 differs from column 2 in that it restricts the sample to driver-weeks for which there is a corresponding belief expectation.
The base sample is drivers in the data subset. In addition, in columns l , 3, 4, and 5, the sample is restricted to observations
with nonmissing miles, nonmissing average miles to date, and positive mile beliefs.
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down and drive fewer miles). These two checks yield the same result. 12 In contrast to a
"standard" setup where workers hold the same beliefs given their productivity signals,
workers' heterogeneous subjective beliefs predict quitting.

Overprediction Although beliefs are predictive, Figure 1 shows that average beliefs consistently exceeds average productivity. Productivity and beliefs are collapsed by week of
tenure and then smoothed using a local polynomial regression. Workers initially overpredict by roughly 500 miles per week, about 25 % of average productivity. This difference declines over time, though it is persistent and decreases very slowly. Even after 100
weeks, worker overprediction is still around 150-200 miles per week. Panel (a) shows
means, whereas panel (b) shows medians. Two concerns with Panels (a) and (b) are (i)
the sample changes over time (due to quits) and (ii) the productivity line is based on
all workers whereas the belief line is based on workers who respond to the survey in a
given week. To address (i), we restrict the sample to workers who are there for most of
the sample period (at least 75 weeks) in Panel (c). To address (ii), in Panel (d), we remake
the picture dropping the 38% of workers who never respond to the survey. We restrict to
workers who are there at least 75 weeks, and look at medians instead of means (to verify
results are not driven by outliers). In both cases, the overall pattern of overconfidence is
similar, though standard errors are larger. 13
The average results mask that beliefs are sensible in several ways, and there is a lot
of heterogeneity within and across drivers. First, beliefs exhibit aspects of Bayesian updating. As seen in Appendix Table E4, increases in average productivity to date are asso ciated with substantial increases in future beliefs, both across and within drivers. Also
consistent with Bayesian updating, in predicting beliefs, the weight on average productivity to date increases with tenure (column 3 of Table E4). Second, although beliefs exceed miles in almost every week when averaged over all drivers, individual beliefs exceed miles only 65 % of the time; in 35 % of driver-weeks, drivers underpredict, so it is
not the case that each driver overpredicts each week. Third, drivers differ substantially
in average overprediction. Appendix Figure E3 shows that many drivers are moderately
overconfident, some are well calibrated, and some are very overconfident. Fourth, as
12 Despite

the different checks and despite the fact that the coefficient on beliefs does not change much
by including observable variables, it is possible that there may be selection on unobserved variables. Thus,
we interpret the results here as evidence that overconfidence correlates with fewer quits instead of that
overconfidence causes fewer quits. In addition to these checks, one might also think to include some version of (Beliefs minus Productivity) instead of Beliefs as a regressor. However, as we discuss after Proposition 1 in Appendix C, it is the level of a person's perceived inside and outside options that affects quitting
in theory, not overprediction. Further, including (Beliefs minus Productivity) as a regressor imposes the
restriction that coefficients on Beliefs and Productivity are the same.
13 In Panels (c) and (d), we stop at 75 weeks instead of the full sample to increase sample size. However,
results are similar if we restrict to workers who are there for 100 weeks. More generally, we have made the
basic graph comparing productivity and productivity beliefs a number of different ways, including varying means versus medians, restricting to workers with different tenure levels, restricting based on survey
response (all subjects, excluding subjects who never respond, restricting only to weeks where both sub ject productivity and productivity belief are available), and dropping high outliers in productivity beliefs.
Across specifications, although the exact levels of overconfidence vary, the basic graph is broadly similar. In
Appendix Figure E2, we plot (Beliefs - Productivity) as a function of tenure, as opposed to plotting beliefs
and productivity as separate lines.
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FIGURE 1. Overconfidence: comparing subjective productivity forecasts with actual worker productivity (as a function of worker tenure). Notes : This figure analyzes actual and believed productivity for the drivers in the data subset. Each subfigure is plotted using a local polynomial
regression with an Epanechnikov kernel. At a given week of tenure ton the figure, actual productivity is the productivity achieved during that week, whereas believed productivity int represents
the driver's expectation about miles in week t + 1. Observations are excluded from the sample if
weekly miles are 0, if weekly predicted miles are 0, or if the driver is ever observed in the dataset
receiving activity-based pay or salary pay instead of being paid by the mile. We restrict attention to weeks of tenure between 6 and 110 (early weeks involve training and the sample becomes
relatively scant after around 2 years). A bandwidth of 5 weeks is used for the productivity data
and a bandwidth of7 weeks is used for the belief data. In panels (a) and (c), the productivity and
belief data are collapsed into weekly means before local polynomial smoothing. In panels (b)
and (d) , the productivity and belief data are collapsed into weekly medians before local polynomial smoothing. In panel (d), we restrict to the 62% of workers who ever respond to the survey.
The figure is similar ifwe restrict miles to weeks where the driver responds to the survey, though
standard errors are larger. It may seem surprising that the initial amount of overconfidence is
large. However, as noted in Section 3.1, this figure averages across workers. At an individual level,
workers only overpredict their productivity in 65 % of driver-weeks (with the percentage calculated excluding instances where miles driven next week is 0, that is, where often the driver is
not working). Thus, drivers are not individually overpredicting every week, as there is substantial
idiosyncratic variation in miles in the data.
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mentioned above in Section 2.1 , there is a lot of week-to-week variation in productivity
that drivers do not control.
That workers' beliefs are sensible in several ways suggests to us that their beliefs
are plausible (and not a mark simply of people not taking the survey seriously). Also,
Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets (2018) recently collected data that broadly confirm our
results. After our paper first appeared, Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets (2018) worked
with a firm where store managers were asked to predict their quintile in a tournament
where store managers competed against one another in terms of quarterly store performance. Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets (2018) also found evidence of persistent workplace overconfidence (with overprediction even among managers who had been there
for 2 years or more). 14 Thus, our long-term field evidence on overconfidence in the workplace has recently been replicated in a very different context.
We also emphasize that drivers did not receive direct feedback in the form of someone telling them that they had made overpredictions or underpredictions in the past.
Receiving such feedback might have reduced the persistence of overconfidence (Benson and Onkal (1992)).
There are several interpretations of our result that workers tend to systematically
overpredict productivity. For example, workers may report aspirations instead of true
expectations. Or, workers may report expected miles supposing that "everything goes
well" and there are no unexpected hiccups. For both these explanations, one might
imagine that misprediction could be eliminated if workers were incentivized to state
the mean of their subjective productivity distribution. Alternatively, overprediction may
reflect workers' true beliefs and instead reflect a persistent behavioral bias that would
be hard to eliminate with an incentive; overprediction may persist, given both substantial idiosyncratic variation in miles and given potential variance bias. To distinguish between these explanations, we turn to incentivized data.
3.2 Incentivized belief data from Firm B
To distinguish between these different explanations and to overcome other concerns
with non-incentivized data (e.g., that nonincentivized subjects do not "think hard"
enough about their forecasts), we randomized financial incentives for truckers at another large trucking company, Firm B, to accurately guess about their productivity. 272
14 Their study is complementary to ours and differs in several important respects. First, while we study
absolute overconfidence, Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets (2018) studied relative overconfidence. Second,
unlike us (who survey new workers every week for 2 years), Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets (2018) surveyed
their managers one time. Third, Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets (2018) provided evidence in support of
selective memory as a mechanism for overconfidence: they ask managers to recall performance in a past
tournament (prior to the one being surveyed about), and observe that managers who did well in the past
have accurate perceptions, whereas those who did poorly tend to remember themselves doing better than
they actually did. This is broadly related to, but different from, our assumptions in the structural model
(Section 4 below), where we allow people's perception of signal precision to potentially differ from true
signal precision. In our setting, because a majority of people exhibit overprediction, they often get signals
that are worse than their beliefs; thus, ignoring or forgetting bad signals is similar to thinking the signal is
less precise than it actually is.
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workers were randomly assigned to guess without financial incentives or to receive up
to $10 per week for guessing about their productivity. 15 Subjects did this for about 26 weeks before being reassigned to another treatment: control (nothing changes), increased incentive (up to $50 per week), or "debiasing." 16 See Appendix B for further information (e.g., how stake size was chosen).
Appendix Table B2 shows that neither the $10 incentive nor the $50 incentive had a
significant impact on productivity beliefs. Given that the standard errors are moderately
sized, we cannot rule out moderate-sized effects in either direction. For example, using
column 1 of Table B2, the 95 % confidence interval on the impact of the $10 incentive
was -131 miles to +66 miles, and the 95 % confidence interval on the impact of the $50
incentive was -181 miles to +171 miles. However, given a mean overconfidence level
of 250 miles in the column 1 sample, we can rej ect the hypothesis that all the observed
overconfidence would disappear if workers were given either $10 or $50 incentives.
Furthermore, Appendix Table ES shows that there is no evidence that the predictive ness of subj ective beliefs toward actual productivity varies with the randomized incentives.
4.

MODEL AN D STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION

Our reduced-form analysis suggests that workers overpredict their productivity, as well
as that greater beliefs are correlated with a lower chance of quitting. We now develop
a structural model of quitting and belief formation to h elp understand these results, as
well as to do a counterfactual of how eliminating overconfidence affects firm profits and
worker welfare.
The model is similar to Jovanovic (1979), though it has discrete time and allows for
biased beliefs. A worker decides each week whether to quit his job. It is an optimal stopping problem; once he quits, he cannot return. 17 Quitting is the only decision to makein particular, there is no effort decision. 18 Workers have different underlying productivities, but productivity is initially unknown, both to the worker and the firm . The worker
is forward-looking in his quitting decision and each week's miles provides him a noisy
signal from which he learns about his underlying productivity. However, workers may be
subject to belief biases. The worker's priors need not be accurate, for example, he may
15 While we focus on productivity, we also had subjects guess about their weekly earnings (see Appendix B).
16 "Debiasing" refers to an additional experiment treatment where we provided information abo ut the existence of overconfidence in truckers so as to see if overconfidence co uld be reduced. Providing information
about the existen ce of overconfidence led to some decreases in productivity beliefs, but impacts seemed to
fade with time since treatment, giving us limited power to examine wh ether randomized ch anges in beliefs
affected quitting. Discussion is left to Appendix B.
17 While workers who quit Firm A are allowed to reapply, relatively few return. Of inexperienced workers
starting in 2002- 2003 who quit during 2002- 2003, less than 8% return by th e end of 2009.
18 Effort decisions are not included in most related structural learnin g models (e.g., Arcidiacono (2004),
Stange (20 12)) . Our data do not contain exogenous variation in the piece rate that would be needed to plausibly identify the cost of effort function. We speculate, however, that including effort in the model would not
qualitatively affect our main conclusions or would actually strength en them (see Appendix A.8 for further
discussion).
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believe that the job is on average quite lucrative. Further, as new productivity information arrives, he may over or underweight his prior relative to pure Bayesian updating.
In addition to reflecting productivity beliefs, quitting decisions will also reflect a driver's
underlying taste for the job or career (e.g., how much a driver dislikes being away from
home) as well as idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., a fight with the boss). The firm makes no
decisions. 19
4.1 Model setup

The time horizon is infinite and given in weeks 1, 2, .... Workers have baseline productivity YJ, which is distributed N ( rio , <T5). Workers are paid by a piece rate, w 1 , that depends
on their tenure. Workers know the piece rate- tenure profile, and believe that this profile
will not be changed by the company at some future date. 20 A worker's weekly miles, y 1 ,
are distributedN(a(t) +YJ , <T; ), 21 and weekly earnings are thus Y 1 = w 1 y1 • a(t) is a known
learning by doing process, which we specify below. The worker's outside option is r1 and
also depends on his tenure. Every period t, the worker makes a decision, d 1 , whether to
stay (d 1 = 1) or to quit (d 1 = 0). Workers make the decision to quit int having observed
their past miles y1, y2, ... , y1_ 1, but not their current week miles, y 1 • Workers and firms
are assumed to be risk-neutral and to have a discount factor given by 8. 22

Stay-or-quit decisions Workers make their stay-or-quit decisions every period to maximize perceived expected utility:
(3)

where x 1 is the vector of state variables (x1 includes past miles, y1 , ... , y1_ 1 , and is detailed further below). (3) can be written as a Bellman equation: Vi(x 1 ) = maxd1 E 1 (u 1 (d 1 ,
Xr)

+ 8Vi+1(X1+1)ld1 , X1).

The per-period utility from staying at the job is equal to the sum of the worker's nonpecuniary taste for the job, earnings, and an idiosyncratic shock:

19 In the model, the piece rate-tenure profile and training contract are taken as given. In addition, the
firm is assumed not to fire workers. In the data subset, quitting is over 3 times more common than firing,
and ignoring firing enormously simplifies the model by preventing us from having to estimate a dynamic
game.
20 Assumptions of this form are standard in structural labor and personnel economics, and allow us to
avoid having to specify beliefs over possible future firm policy changes. We believe the assumption is reasonable in our setting, given it is not common for the firm to make large changes in the pay schedule.
21Assuming that signals are normally distributed is standard in structural learning models (Ching, Erdem, and Keane (2013)) . Visually, the distribution of signals (miles) among all workers has a bell shape
centered close to around 2000 miles, suggesting this assumption is reasonable (and that the distribution is
closer to normal than to log-normal or uniform).
22 Risk neutrality is assumed in many dynamic learning models (e.g. , Crawford and Shum (2005), Nagypal
(2007), Stange (2012), Goettler and Clay (201 1)), though not in all (for examples with risk aversion, see the
survey by Ching, Erdem, and Keane (2013)) . Coscelli and Shum (2004) showed that risk parameters are not
identified in certain classes of learning models.
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where a is the worker's nonpecuniary taste for the job, and sf is an i.i.d. idiosyncratic
error unobserved to the econometrician (but observed by the worker) with an Extreme
Value-Type 1 distribution with zero mean and scale parameter T. Since workers likely
differ unobservedly in taste for the job, we assume there is unobserved heterogeneity in
nonpecuniary taste for the job, a, with a drawn from a mass-point distribution (Heckman and Singer (1 984)).
If the worker quits, he may have to pay a fine associated with the training contract.
Let the vector k denote the training contract, with kt the penalty for quitting at tenure t.
The utility from quitting is the fine, plus the discounted value of his outside option, plus
an idiosyncratic shock:

sP

is an i.i.d. unobserved idiosyncratic error with the same distribution as sf. 23
where
Let V/ = Et(Ut(l,xt) + 8Vi+1Cxt+1lll,xt) and ViQ = Et(Ut(O,xt) + 8Vi+1(X1+1ll0,xt) be
the choice-specific value functions for staying and quitting, respectively. Plugging in for
Ut(l , Xt) and Ut(O , Xt ), the choice-specific value functions are given by
Q
ft
Vi =-kt+ - l-o

Q _ -Q
= Vt

+ st

Vis= a+ E(WtYtlXt)

Q

+ st

,

(4)

+ 0E(Vi+1 (Xt+i)lxt) +sf= v; +sf,

and the Bellman equation can be rewritten as Vi(x1) = maxdiE{O,lJ(v'is (xi) , ViQ(xt) ).
Agents gradually learn about their productivity as more and more productivity signals are observed. After T periods, we assume that learning about productivity stops. In
addition, after this time, there is no more training contract; the worker believes learning
is complete; and there is no more growth in underlying productivity, the outside option,
or wages. 24 Thus, after passage of T periods, worker behavior is governed by the following asymptotic value functions:
VQ

= -rT- + sQ = V Q + sQ
l-o

vs= a+ WTE(YT+1IXT+1)
V(x)

=

'

+ oE(V(x')lx) + ss =Vs+ ss,

(5)

max (Vs(x) , VQ(x)).
dE{O,l}

23 Even though only a portion of the penalties owed were collected, as described in Section 2, we assume
that drivers act as if the utility cost of quitting is equivalent to the utility loss from paying the contract
penalty. We believe this assumption is reasonable. Firm A was very firm with new drivers about its intention
to collect money owed upon a quit. After a quit, drivers who did not pay faced aggressive collection contacts
by both Firm A and collection agencies, as well as the reporting of delinquency to credit agencies. As a
robustness check, we have experimented with estimating versions of the model assuming drivers act as if
the utility loss from quitting is 0.3 times the penalty. Model fit tended to be less good. Indeed, our preferred
model still fails to fully match the quitting spike at 1 year, as seen in Figure 2.
24 This reflects our focus on weekly outcomes during 2 years of data as opposed to a very long-term analysis.
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Belief formation In a standard normal learning model, a worker's expectation of his
period t productivity equals the weighted sum of his prior and his demeaned average
productivity to date:

(6)

As t increases, the agent eventually shifts all the weight from his prior to his average
productivity signals. We augment the standard learning model in two ways. First, we
allow for agents to be overconfident: instead of believing that their productivity, Y/, is
drawn from a distribution N(YJo,
agents believe YJ is drawn from a distribution
N ( YJo + YJ b,
Second, we allow for agents to have a perception of signal noise that
may be different from the true signal noise: workers perceive the standard deviation
of weekly productivity signals to be <Ty instead of <Ty , With these two assumptions, an
agent's subjective expectation of his productivity, denoted by Eb (where b stands for belief), is

<r5),

<r5).

t-l

L(Ys - a(s))

+

(t- l)<T5
(t - l)<T5 +

~

<r/

s=l

- - - - + a ( t).

t- l

(7)

If Y/ b is greater (less) than zero, agents exhibit positive (negative) mean bias or overconfidence (underconfidence). As more signals come in, agents learn not to be overconfident, eventually putting zero weight on ( YJo + Y/ b) , The speed at which this occurs is
determined by <Ty , Also, since learning is believed complete after T periods have passed,
Eb(YT+1IXT+1)

=

I:f-i<~-a (s))

+ a(T).

We allow that workers' reported subjective beliefs include some measurement error,
as accurately reporting one's beliefs about productivity may be unusual or unfamiliar
for a worker. We assume that reported beliefs equal underlying subjective beliefs plus
a normally distributed error. Recall that drivers in week t make predictions about miles
in t + l. The reported subjective belief, bit, of driver i at tenure week t is distributed:
bit~ N(Eb(Yit+l IYil, · · · , Yi1-1), <TE)- 25

Summary of within period timing The within period timing in week tis as follows:
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1. Workers form beliefs b1 given past miles y1, y2, ... , Yt-l ·

2.

t:{ and e~ are realized and workers decide whether or not to quit.

3. y 1 is realized, if they do not quit.
25 Note that E b (y; 1+1IYil , ... , Yir- 1) and E b(y;, IY;1 , ... , y;,_i) are the same except for the learning by doing
term.
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Leaming by doing and skill accumulation Productivity increases with the learning by
doing function a(t) = 2a 1 * ( -0.5 + A(a2 * (t -1 ))), where A(x) = 1:~~) and tis worker
tenure in weeks. a(t) depends only on tenure; thus, the speed of learning by doing does
not depend on the number of miles driven or on the ability of the driver. Workers fully
anticipate the path of a(t). 26
We also account for skill accumulation following CDL training. After CDL training
at Firm A, drivers do "on-the-job training" which includes driving the truck with an experienced driver riding along. We use a length of 5 weeks for on-the-job training. 27 We
account for the possibility that drivers may gain valuable skills during this time: we assume the outside option over time is 1·1 = r - G-mt{t ,GJ so. We fix r using outside data,
while s0 , the value of skills from on-the-job training, is estimated. (Besides allowing for
skill accumulation during the first 5 weeks, we alternatively estimate the model allowing
for continuous skill accumulation: r 1 = r + 20 1 * (-0.5 + A ( 02 * (t - 1))), where 01 and 02
are parameters to estimate.)
Solving the model The state variables consist of past miles, current tenure, a possible
vector of fixed observable individual characteristics (X), a person's taste for the job, a
person's level of overconfidence, and the idiosyncratic shocks: x 1 = (y1 , ... , y 1_ 1 , t, X , a ,
Y/ b, c 1 ) . The model can allow for heterogeneity in taste for the job and/or in overconfidence. To solve the model, we first solve for the asymptotic value functions (after learning has stopped) using value function iteration. With the asymptotic value functions in
hand, backward recursion can then be applied to solve the dynamic programming problem. We provide further details in Appendix D.
4.2 Discussion of model assumptions

Outside option In our model, the outside option, r1 , depends on tenure, but not productivity. This feature differs from many models of firm-sponsored general training
where the worker is paid the same share of his marginal product at both his inside and
outside option (though less than his full marginal product at both), for example, Acemoglu and Pischke (1 999). We believe our assumption is realistic in our context given
that only 12% of workers who exit report moving to a long-haul trucking job, with the
vast majority moving to another type of work (see Section 2.2). Having high ability in
long-haul trucking does not necessarily imply that one will have high ability in nontruckingjobs or even in short-haul trucking. 28
26 The logistic functional form is consistent with Jovanovic and yarko 's (1996) microfounded model of
learning by doing in which the speed of learning decreases over time, as well as the empirical results on
tenure and productivity in Shaw and Lazear (2008). Here, a1 is the total amount by which productivity
increases and a2 indicates the speed of learning by doing. We believe our assumption that workers fully
anticipate the learning by doing process is reasonable in our setting, where the presence of learning by
doing seems to be understood.
27 During this time, drivers often are paid by flat salary instead of by mile. We use a flat salary of $375
per week during on-the-job training. We also ass ume drivers do not begin learning about their productivity
until after 5 weeks, and that nonpecuniary taste for the job is zero during on-the-job training.
28 As discussed in Section 2, in contrast to long-haul drivers, short-haul drivers are often not paid by
the mile. For short-haul drivers, relationship-management skills (for managing customer and client rela-
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In addition, our assumption about the outside option is consistent with our earlier
finding that, all else equal, workers with higher productivity to date are substantially less
likely to quit. That is, if workers had the same productivity in their inside and outside
options and were paid the same share of their marginal product at each, then high and
low ability workers would be equally likely to quit. As seen in columns 2- 3 of Table 3,
this is not the case.

Beliefs While our model allows for nonstandard belief formation, these features are estimated from data instead of imposed. The model does not assume that people have
overconfident priors or learn more slowly than would be predicted by Bayes' rule, but
rather these features are identified via the belief data (see Section 4.3); our model nests
the standard model as a special case. Several aspects of our generalized normal learning
model receive support from the results in Section 3. Differences in subjective beliefs are
moderately predictive of differences in productivity across workers, but only mildly predictive within workers. This finding is consistent (broadly) with our modeling assump tion that workers do not have private information about their underlying productivity.
Underlying beliefs do, however, affect quitting decisions in our model, which is consistent with our earlier empirical finding that, all else equal, workers with greater belief bias
are less likely to quit. Although drivers in the model have biased beliefs, they correctly
anticipate future changes in their beliefs.
A strong assumption in the model is that workers are not overconfident about their
outside option despite potentially being overconfident about their current job ability.
However, for overconfidence to "lock in" workers, this assumption is stronger than necessary. Instead, overconfidence will reduce quitting if the worker is more overconfident
about his current job earnings than his outside option (see Proposition 1 in Appendix C);
that is, he exhibits differential overconfidence. If the strong assumption of no outside
overconfidence fails, but workers are still differentially overconfident, overconfidence
will still theoretically reduce quitting, but less so than if the strong assumption held.
While the assumption of differential overconfidence is difficult to test, we present 6
pieces of evidence and arguments on why it seems reasonable in our setting. Though
no piece individually is foolproof, together, the 6 pieces significantly support the as sumption of differential overconfidence. We begin with the strongest pieces of argument/ evidence, moving down to pieces that are more speculative.
1. Insofar as drivers select the job at which they believe their ability will be the highest,
this may lead them toward being differentially overconfident about their ability at the
current job relative to the outside option. 29
tionships) may be more important than being able to do a lot of miles quickly while far from home. Some
workers will be better at long-haul whereas others will be better at short-haul.
29 Van den Steen (2004) provided a "winner's curse" argument on how self-selection can promote belief
biases. Consider a worker choosing among several jobs. For each job, he receives a noisy signal about his
productivity there. The agent will naturally choose the job with the highest signal, and will be overconfident
there relative to other jobs. While it is easy to imagine that workers may have different beliefs when choosing
between long-haul trucking jobs and nonlong-haul trucking jobs, it is also quite possible that workers might
expect to have different productivity at different long-haul trucking firms. For example, one driver may have
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2. We collected data on workers' perceived outside options. Drivers in the data subset
were asked what their earnings would have been had they not started work with Firm A.
First, we compare drivers' responses to this question to what "similar-looking" people
earned in 2006 in the March 2007 Current Population Survey (CPS). As Appendix Figure E4 shows, the perceived outside option workers would have earned had they not
gone through training does not appear to be higher than what people like them in the
CPS are earning. Second, there is little correlation between a worker's perceived inside
option and his perceived outside option (see balded text in the notes of Figure E4 for de tails). If workers were equally overconfident about their inside and outside options, we
would expect that workers who were more confident about their inside options to also
be more confident about their outside options, but this is not the case.
3. Table 3 showed that, all else equal, workers with higher productivity beliefs are less

likely to quit while controlling for actual productivity to date. This finding is supportive
of differential overconfidence.30
4. While current earnings are proportional to ability in long-haul trucking, most US
jobs do not pay piece rates. Thus, even if workers are overconfident about their productivity at their outside option, it is unclear how much this affects workers' perceptions of
their earnings at their outside option. 31
5. It is possible that new workers may form productivity expectations using information from experienced drivers who are reasonably successful as truckers. New workers
may fail to fully recognize that those who "make it" as truckers (i) are endogenously selected and that the full sample of new drivers may not be as successful on average and
(ii) have already gone through an initial period of increasing productivity.
6. The assumption of differential overconfidence is consistent with evidence in psychology and behavioral economics (see Appendix A.9 for details). 32 The main idea is
a lot of experience driving around the South and would be less productive at a firm where most of the routes
were in the ortheast. Based on where the routes are, it may be harder for a driver to get home regularly,
and spending a lot of time getting home could negatively affect productivity. In a related line of thinking,
Lazear (2016) argued that differential overconfidence emerges naturally in a model of occupational choice
(since people are likely to choose expectations with positive expectation errors), and provided evidence for
this using CPS and PSID data.
30 In Proposition 1 in Appendix C, we prove that more overconfident workers will be less likely to quit if
and only if they are more overconfident about the inside than the outside option. This finding would seem
unlikely if workers had the same beliefs about their inside and outside options. Moreover, if having high
productivity beliefs was indicative of drivers who think the "grass is always greener" in other jobs, then high
beliefs would be correlated with more quitting, not less.
3 1 In the data of Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009), performance pay is used in only 37% of U.S. jobs,
comprises a median of 4% of total pay across jobs, and is less common in blue-collar jobs like trucking
than white-collar jobs. Of course, other pecuniary aspects of a job (e.g., the perceived probability of being
promoted to a higher wage) may be affected by overconfidence.
32 The assumption of differential overconfidence may be more important for the interpretation of the
counterfactuals than the structural estimation. In the structural estimation, overconfidence about the inside option varies over time due to learning. Thus, the model-specified overconfidence about the inside
option would not be exactly offset by overconfidence about the outside option unless it varied over time in
the same way (this is one important way in which the dynamic structural model differs from the one-period
model in Appendix C). Appendix A.9 discusses further.
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that, to avoid cognitive dissonance and other psychological discomfort, drivers who
have invested significant time, energy, and training contract debt into starting out with
working at Firm A may engage in a form of "motivated reasoning" in order to believe that
they made the right choice to start work where they did relative to their outside option
(Kunda (1990)).

Microfoundations of overconfidence Several theoretical microfoundations for overconfidence have been proposed in the literature, including evolutionary advantages, selfsignaling, and social-signaling. We remain agnostic about the source of the overconfidence (since our model and estimation do not depend on knowing the source) . Our
contribution is to document overconfidence and explore the implications of overconfidence for behavior and welfare, not to understand its foundation. We do, however, as sume that agents do not receive psychological utility from their beliefs, consistent with
our Section 3 experimental finding that incentives do not appear to reduce overconfidence. If agents received psychological utility from beliefs, we might expect them to
trade off incentives for accuracy with the utility value from stating high beliefs (unless,
of course, the personal benefits from stating optimistic beliefs are so strong that agents
are unwilling to trade-off moderate-sized incentives to reduce their optimism). (To the
extent that the assumption is incorrect and truckers do receive substantial psychological benefits from their beliefs, this would cause us to overstate the benefit to workers of
eliminating overconfidence.) Also, we remain agnostic whether workers are overconfident about their own skills (e.g., "I have great endurance on the road") versus whether
they are overoptimistic about external events (e.g., "traffic will be better next week").
Learning about productivity We model quitting as a product of worker learning. This is
consistent with Table 3 where, all else equal, workers with higher subjective productivity
beliefs are less likely to quit, as are workers with higher average productivity to date. Also
consistent with learning, in predicting beliefs, the weight on average productivity to date
rises with tenure.
4.3 Estimation and identification

The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. In Appendix D, we derive the likelihood
function and describe the estimation procedure. Although the parameters are jointly
identified, we can discuss key data features that allow us to identify particular model
parameters.

Productivity and skill parameters The productivity parameters <To, <Ty , and Y/o are identified primarily by the productivity data. <To reflects the degree of permanent productivity differences across individuals. <Ty reflects differences within individuals in productivity. Y/o reflects the mean average ability of workers in the population. The learning by
doing parameters, a 1 and a2 , are identified by how much productivity goes up (a 1 ) and
how quickly (a 2 ). 33 The skill gain parameter, s0 , is identified based on turnover levels
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33 Note that u o, Y/ 0, a 1 , and a2 also appear in E b. The beliefs and attrition data also help identify these
parameters.
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during the first 5 weeks when workers are driving with an experienced driver. The continuous skill gain parameters, 0 1 and 02, are identified by how much quitting changes
with tenure given the increase in measured productivity.

Taste heterogeneity The taste for job parameters are identified from persistent differences between individual quitting behavior and the predictions of the model. Suppose
that the data contained many low-productivity workers who nevertheless kept choosing not to quit. This would cause the model to estimate that there is a large amount of
unobserved taste heterogeneity.
Belief parameters The subjective beliefs data are critical for identifying the belief parameters. Prior mean bias (overconfidence), Y/b, is identified primarily by the difference
between believed and actual productivity, particularly at lower tenure levels. The believed standard deviation of productivity shocks, CTy , determines the subjective speed of
learning. The larger CTy is, the slower that agents' initial overprediction will disappear.
The standard deviation of beliefs, CTb, is identified by noise in beliefs unrelated to information in model-predicted subjective expectations. An increase in CTb leads to greater
week-to-week fluctuations in beliefs unrelated to actual productivity. 34
Scale parameter The scale parameter of the idiosyncratic shock, 'T, is identified based
off of how much quitting behavior in the data differs from that predicted by a model with
individual unobserved heterogeneity, but no time-varying error terms. Higher levels of
'T tend to flatten the quit hazard with respect to worker tenure.
4.4 Implementation

The outside option, r, is taken to be the median full -time 2006 earnings from the 2007
March CPS of workers like the data subset "median" driver (35 -year old males with a
high school degree), which is $32,000 per year. 35 We convert this to a weekly wage of
$640. The weekly discount factor, 8, is set to o = 0.9957, corresponding to an annual
discount factor of 0.8.36 We do not include demographic covariates or heterogeneity in
34 Possible heterogeneity in Y/b (discussed in Appendix A.10) is identified from differences across people
in the extent of productivity overprediction. We also note that Y/ b and Uy, in addition to affecting subjective
beliefs, will also affect quitting. For example, the faster that agents begin to rely on their average productivity
to date in making quit decisions (i.e., the faster their quitting decisions reflect "learning"), the smaller that
Uy will be.
35 In the data subset, high school graduate is the modal educational category (40% of drivers) whereas
some college is the median category. Table Fl shows our estimates are very similar ifwe assume a higher
outside option.
36 In most dynamic structural models, the discount factor is assumed rather than estimated, as it is usually weakly identified. An annual discount factor of 0. 80 is "low," but is comparable or higher than discount
factors used or estimated in other models analyzing dynamic choices of blue-collar or low-income workers
(e.g., Paserman (2008), Fang and Silverman (2009), Warner and Fleeter (2001)) . We have experimented with
various discount factors in sensitivity analysis, and assuming a higher annual discount factor such as 0.90
yields quite similar estimates (see Table Fl). A discount factor of 0 yields a substantially worse fit, evidence
that workers in our context are forward-looking.
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overconfidence. 37 Learning stops after T = 130 periods. We use data on up to 110 weeks
per driver. After presenting our baseline estimates, we discuss robustness to alternative
assumptions. We estimate using 699 workers with complete data (see Appendix D).
4.5 Structural results

Table 4 displays the main structural estimates and indicates substantial mean bias and
variance bias. As a benchmark, column 1 provides estimates assuming no mean bias.
Column 2 allows for mean bias, estimating bias, Y/ b, of 674 miles (or roughly one-third of
1993 miles, the estimated mean of the true productivity distribution). The productivity
parameters in column 2 also differ from those in column 1 and seem more reasonable in
size. 38 In terms of variance bias, the believed standard deviation of productivity shocks
is roughly 2.5 times higher than the actual standard deviation of productivity shocks.
This implies that workers update beliefs considerably slower than predicted by Bayes'
?

rule. Recall that the weight agents place on their signals relative to their prior is

- ?,

~a-0
ta-o+ a-y-

where t is the number of weeks of learning realized following the first 5 weeks of no
learning. After 20 weeks of learning, the worker is estimated to place weight 0.38 on his
signals (whereas if u y = u y , the worker would place weight 0.77 on his signals). 39 Table 4
also indicates significant heterogeneity in nonp ecuniary taste for the job.
Table 5 takes the baseline model and adds learning by doing and continuous skill
accumulation. The fit is better in both specifications than in Table 4. Many of the parameters are qualitatively similar to before, but there are some differences. In column
two, the mean prior bias is larger than before, estimated at 754 miles. The estimated
taste heterogeneity is also somewhat different.
Figure 2 shows the model fits the data quite well. We simulate 200,000 drivers using the estimates in column 2 of Table 5. The model tightly matches the survival and
productivity-tenure curves. As in the data, the model-predicted quit hazard is inverse
U-shaped. The model-predicted quit hazard is initially increasing, reflecting learning
about productivity. When workers are uncertain about their productivity, they face an
incentive to wait and see how productive they will be before quitting. Also, the model
predicts a large spike in quitting after 1 year (when drivers come off the 12-month contract).
37 We have also experimented in the past with model variants that included covariates, for example, allowing taste for the job, a , to depend on gender, education , race, and age. However, including covariates
tended to have little effect on the other parameter estimates and on model fit. See Card and Hyslop (2005)
for anoth er dynamic model wh ere covariates are excluded because they do not significantly improve mo del
fit. Appendix A.10 discusses heterogeneity in overconfidence.
38 For example, the mean of the prior productivity distribution is 1993 miles per week, down roughly 20%
from 2436 miles per week in column 1. In column 1, the productivity parameters n eed to help explain not
only the productivity data, but also the subj ective beliefs and quitting data, and this "pulls" up the estimate
of T/ 0·
39 This finding is consistent with the well-known psychological phenomenon of "conservatism" (Edwards
(1968)), where agents update less than a rational agent would after receiving new information. For recent
evidence on conservatism, see Eiland Rao (2011) and Mobius et al. (2014). For theory on conservative updating, see Schwartzstein (2014).
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TABLE 4.

Worker overconfidence
Baseline structural estimates.
o Bias

7) 0

Productivity and skiU parameters
Mean of prior productivity dist

CTQ

Std dev of prior productivity dist

CTy

Std dev of productivity shocks

so

Value of skilled gain wks 1-5

/J-,J

Taste UH parameters
Mass point 1 of taste UH

J.1,2

Mass point 2 of taste UH

/J-,3

Mass point 3 of taste UH

Pl

Probability type 1

P2

Probability type 2

7J b

Belief parameters
Belief bias

CTy

Believed std dev of productivity shocks

CTb

Std dev in beliefs

T

Scale parameter
Scale param of idiosyncratic shock

Log-likelihood
umber of workers

337

Belief Bias

(1)

(2)

2436
(18)
500
(21)
708
(3.5)
10.6
(2.3)

1993
(15)
292
(11 )
708
(3.5 )
4. 1
(4.0)

-249
(8)
-112
(15 )
131
(39)
0.55
(0.04)
0.23
(0.03 )

-290
(20)
-138
(12)
145
(40)
0.31
(0.06 )
0.46
(0.06 )

3737
(163)
886
(8.2)

674
(32)
1673
(128)
877
(8 .0)

1629
(180)

2553
(450 )

-94,401
699

-94,127
699

Note: This table presents estimates of the structural parameters. The idiosyncratic shock, skill gain, and taste parameters
are given in terms of dollars whereas the productivity and belief parameters are given in terms of miles. "Taste UH" stands for
unobserved heterogeneity in taste for the job. Standard errors are in parentheses and are calculated by inverting the Hessian.
A weekly discount factor of 0.9957 is assumed for workers and firms, corresponding to an annual discount factor of 0.8. The
data are from 699 drivers in the data subset, all of whom face the 12-month training contract.

In contrast, model fit without belief bias is considerably worse, as seen in Figure 3 .
Unlike in Figure 2, the model-predicted survival and productivity-tenure curves do not
closely fit the data. Model-predicted average beliefs incorrectly slope up with respect to
tenure instead of down as in Figure 2. While the quit hazard has a large spike after 1 year,
one even larger than in Figure 2, the model does far worse predicting the quit hazard in
the first 40 weeks.
Turning from qualitative to quantitative fit, the models with mean bias (column 2 in
Tables 4 and 5) fit the data much better in terms of overall fit than the models without
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5. Structural estimates with learning by doing and skill accumulation.

1)0

Productivity and skill parameters
Mean of prior productivity dist

ao

Std dev of prior productivity dist
Std dev of productivity shocks
Learning by doing level
Learning by doing speed
Skill accumulation level
Skill accumulation speed
Taste UH parameters
Mass point 1 of taste UH

No Bias

Belief Bias

(1)

(2)

2317
(18)
498

1859

(22)

( 11)

279

708

708

( 1.5)

(1.5)

177

213

(14)

(14)

0.10
(0.02)
101
(31)
0.02
(0.005 )

0.09
(0.01 )
101
(62)
0.02
(0.01 )
-413
(77)
-189
(69)
204
(59)
0.49
(0.06 )
0.28
(0.06 )

/J,2

Mass point 2 of taste UH

/J,3

Mass point 3 of taste UH

- 348
(36)
-103
(31 )
179

Pl

Probability type 1

0.64

P2

Probability type 2

(57)

(0.03 )

0.15
(0.03 )

1Jb

(22)

Belief parameters
Belief bias

754
(26)

Believed std dev of productivity shocks

Std dev in beliefs

T

Scale Parameter
Scale param of idiosyncratic shock

Log-likelihood
umber of workers

3317
(158)
883

1235

(1.7)

(1.7)

1372
(136)

2246
(282)

-94,349
699

-94,043
699

(61)

870

Note: As in Table 4, the idiosyncratic shock, skill gain, and taste parameters are given in terms of dollars whereas the productivity and belief parameters are given in terms of miles. For the newly added param eters here, a I and a 2 are in miles,
whereas 01 and e2 are in dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses and are calculated by BHHH.
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mean bias (column 1 in Tables 4- 5), according to likelihood ratio tests (p < 0.01). To
analyze model fit on the quitting data alone, we compare the observed weekly number
of drivers quitting at week of tenure t, 0 1 , with the number predicted from the model, E 1 ,
using a x2 test. The x2 statistic is Lt CE,£~' l 2 • For the baseline models in Table 4, x2 = 445
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FIGURE 2 . Structural model: model fit. Notes: This figure compares model-simulated data
against the actual data to assess model fit. We plot the survival curve, the quit hazard, the mean
miles-tenure profile, and the mean beliefs-tenure profile. Survival at week tis the share of workers who survive from quitting to the end of week t. The model simulated corresponds to Column 2 in Table 5. We simulate the entire data-generating process for 200 ,000 drivers. The data
are from 699 drivers with the 12-month contract, all of whom are from the same training school
and hired in late 2005 or 2006. The data-based quit hazard, productivity-tenure curve, and beliefs-tenure curve are plotted using an Epanechnikov kernel, with bandwidths of 6 weeks, 5 weeks,
and 10 weeks, respectively.

with no bias in column 1, whereas x2 = 188 with bias in column 2 (p < 0.01). Likewise,
for the extended models in Table 5, x 2 = 288 with no bias in column 1, whereas x2 = 172
with bias in column 2 (p < 0.01). Thus, the fit in terms of quitting is considerably better
in the models with belief bias than without beliefbias. 40

Robustness Appendix Table Fl shows our baseline estimates are quite robust to different assumptions. Increasing the discount factor does not significantly change the
40 x 2

tests are often used to assess the fit of dynamic models (e.g., Keane and Wolpin (1997), Card and
Hyslop (2005)) . They can be used to assess the fit of the model with the data, or to compare model fit from
two competing models. For example, comparing x 2 in column 1 of Table 4 with that in column 2 after one
parameter is added, the difference in x 2 is highly significant (x~/=l = 445 - 188 ➔ p < 0.01 ). (As caveated
in Card and Hyslop (2005), it is more correct to think of the calculated x 2 statistic as an informal measure
of fit, since the predicted numbers are created from the same data being used for the observed cell entries.)
To calculate x 2 , we analyze the actual or model-predicted probabilities of quitting in any of weeks 1- 110, or
in staying through all the first 110 weeks.
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FIGURE 3 . Model fit, with no belief bias. Notes: The notes are the same as for Figure 2 except that
the model simulated corresponds to column 1 in Table 5.

estimates, nor does using inverse probability weighting to address nonresponse. Winsorizing subjective beliefs at 4000 miles modestly decreases the mean bias term to
614 miles, which is still a quite substantial level of mean bias, suggesting that very
high beliefs are not the main driver of the overall mean bias. Allowing learning to
occur over 200 weeks (instead of 130) and increasing the outside option also do not
much change the estimates. Results are also qualitatively robust to allowing for heterogeneity in overconfidence. Appendix A.10 discusses this and additional robustness
checks.
One can imagine alternative nonstandard economic forces that affect a worker's
taste for the job, for example, feelings of commitment toward the firm providing training. However, time-invariant shifters of job taste are already accounted for via the taste
heterogeneity parameters. In contrast, overconfidence provides a time-varying impact
on the value of staying that fits the data well.
Out-of-sample fit Drivers in our sample have the 12-month training contract described
in Section 2.1. Another paper (Hoffman and Burks (2017)) studies worker behavior under three different contractual regimes (the 12-month contract, a no contract regime,
and an 18-month pro-rated contract) , showing that the model developed in the present
paper can predict some basic retention patterns under the no contract and 18-month
contract regimes. Thus, our structural model also makes reasonable out-of-sample predictions.
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5. COUNTERFACTUAL SIMULATION: DEBIASING

Set-up for counte,factuals
We use our baseline structural estimates (column 2 of Table 4) to quantify the importance of biased beliefs. Profits are defined as production profits, plus training contract
penalties, minus training costs. For a worker who quits in period t, profits are
(8)

where P is the price the firm charges for one mile of shipment, me is the nonwage
marginal cost per mile (such as truck wear and fuel costs), W s is the piece rate, Ys is
a driver's productivity, PC is fixed costs per week (such as back office support for the
driver), 0 is the share of the training contract penalty collected by the firm, and TC is
training cost per worker. Based on consultation with Firm A managers, we assume that
P - me= $0.70/mile, 0 = 0.3, PC= $650/week, and TC= $2500 for the new inexperienced workers we study. We equate the firm's weekly discount factor to the worker's,
8 = 0.9957, so as to avoid having results being driven by differences in discount factors;
our conclusions are unchanged if we assume higher discount factors for both worker
and firm. Further details on computing profits are given in Appendix A.12 .1 and Ap pendix 0.
Although workers have biased beliefs, they have standard preferences. Worker welfare is measured by summing earnings, taste for trucking, and idiosyncratic shocks, as
in equation (3).41
For the counterfactuals, we simulate the full data-generating process for 20,000 simulated workers for up to 1300 weeks each. While workers are simulated for up to 1300
weeks, we focus on showing profits per worker and welfare per worker numbers after
110 weeks (corresponding to the maximum number of weeks under observation in the
data). 42 We focus separately on profits and worker welfare, and do not analyze total welfare. 43

Debiasing: Reducing worker overconfidence
To examine quantitatively how overconfidence affects quitting, worker welfare, and
profits, we simulate eliminating worker overconfidence, which we also refer to, following
the psychology literature, as "debiasing." We also consider eliminating overconfidence
41 Since workers have biased beliefs, average experienced utility will differ from ex ante expected utility. We measure welfare using experienced utility; this focus is shared by the empirical work of Grubb and
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Osborne (2015) and the theoretical framework in Mullainathan, Schwarzstein, and Congdon (2012). AppendixA.12.2 gives more details on computing worker welfare.
42 The counterfactuals yield the same qualitative conclusions if we analyze profit and worker welfare after
1300weeks.
43 In considering various counterfactuals, while we found our conclusions on profits and worker welfare
to be very robust to different assumptions, we found total welfare to depend more closely on particular
assumptions made.
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TABLE

Counterfactual:

6. Counterfactual simulations.

Baseline

50% debias

100% debias

Profits per worker
Welfare per worker

$4099
56,856

2747
$58,461

$1142
$59,448

Retention at 20 wks
Retention at 40 wks
Retention at 60 wks

0. 76
0.53
0.41

0.59
0.40
0.32

0.39
0.27
0.24

Note: This table reports the results of the counterfactual simulations described in the text, while assuming that training
contracts are not adjusted in response. Under the 50% debias and 100% debias counterfactuals, worker overconfidence is reduced by 50% or 100% (by reducing T/ b by 50% or 100%). Profits and worker welfare are defined in Section 5 of the text. The
model simulated here corresponds to column 2 of Table 4. "Retention at 20 wks" is the share of workers who survive from
quitting to the start of week 20.

by one-half, recognizing that debiasing may be incomplete in practice. This practice of
analyzing the impacts of counterfactually eliminating a "behavioral" parameter also appears in work such as Handel (2013).
As seen in Table 6, full debiasing increases worker welfare by about 5% since worker
quitting decisions become less distorted by overconfidence. Although the workers exhibit significant turnover in the baseline, turnover becomes even higher when workers
are debiased. In the un-debaised simulation, worker retention is 41 % at the start of week
60, but this falls to 32% under 50% debiasing, and to 24% under 100% debiasing. Without
debiasing, workers tend to interpret low-mileage weeks as repeated instances of "bad
luck" (i.e., weeks that are low relative to their prior beliefs). After debiasing, workers'
quitting decisions are no longer distorted by having a rosy outlook.
In addition, firm profits substantially decline under debiasing. Under full debiasing,
profits per worker decline by about $3000. Due to the increase in quitting, the firm has
less time to make profits from a given worker. Our counterfactual allows us to quantify
how much overconfidence affects profits and worker welfare in this setting.44
6.

CONCLUSION

Using a sample of newly trained truckers, we find that workers tend to persistently
overpredict their productivity (on average), thereby providing robust field evidence on
worker overconfidence. The difference between average miles and average beliefs eventually declines, but only very slowly. Higher productivity beliefs are correlated with
less quitting while controlling for actual productivity to date. To quantify the importance of biased beliefs for profits and welfare, we structurally estimate a quitting model
44 This counterfactual takes training contracts as fixed. It is conceivable that firms would optimally adjust
contracts (wages and training contract penalties) if workers did not exhibit overconfidence. We explored
this extended debiasing counterfactual in an earlier version of the paper. Under this counterfactual of debiasing with optimal contractual responses, the overall conclusions from the baseline debiasing counterfactual remain quite similar. The main difference was that de biasing tended to push firms toward decreasing optimal quit penalties. Even if the training contract is fixed, eliminating worker overconfidence might
make workers unwilling to accept the job in the first place without an increase in the wage. If eliminating
worker overconfidence was also accompanied by an increase in worker wages, this would further increase
the worker welfare benefit of de biasing.
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with potentially biased beliefs. We show that overconfidence increases firm profits: if
worker overconfidence was eliminated, profits per worker would fall substantially. Further, overconfidence moderately reduces worker welfare by distorting worker decisions.
Our results parallel several studies in behavioral industrial organization indicating
that firms may profitably exploit consumers' biases, focusing instead on the behavioral
biases of workers. An important difference in our setting, besides the identity of the parties involved, is the possibility of a baseline market failure of underinvestment (e.g.,
Acemoglu and Pischke (1 999)). In a second-best world with underinvestment in general training, the existence of worker overconfidence makes training more profitable,
potentially increasing the quantity of firm training. Paralleling the work in industrial
organization, we find evidence that agents (in our case, workers) are harmed by a behavioral bias, but our results also raise the possibility that it may not necessarily be in
workers' interests to have that bias eliminated. Unfortunately, because our data are primarily from one firm, we are unable to calculate how overconfidence affects the share
of firms willing to train; thus, we are unable to weigh this benefit against the distortion
from overconfidence on worker decision-making. Additional research is clearly called
for.
While truckers are well suited for examining overconfidence about productivity, it
is important to highlight that we are focusing on one particular job, and the patterns
we document may not necessarily hold in other settings. Future work should examine
whether worker overconfidence occurs in other settings. While piece rate compensation
is not shared by most other jobs, piece rate compensation is not n ecessary for overconfidence to make workers less likely to quit. For example, workers may be overoptimistic
about some other aspect of the job, for example, the probability of being promoted.
Though we focus on workers in firms, overconfidence may help entice or "lock in" individuals in other labor market situations, for example, for the decision of enrolling in
college or for occupational choice in general. 45
Worker overconfidence may be important for many aspects of optimal job design
and compensation. For example, when firms can choose to pay flat wages or piece rates,
paying a piece rate may be appealing if workers are overconfident since overconfident
workers perceive they may earn more than they actually will (Larkin and Leider (2012)) .
Future work should continue to analyze the importance of worker biases for employee
behavior, worker welfare, and firm outcomes. Future work should also seek to better
understand sources of overconfidence.
45 Stinebrickner

and Stinebrickner (2012) showed that college students are initially overconfident about
their likely performance in college. There has been popular discussion, particularly related to law schools,
that students may be overoptimistic abo ut future job prospects wh en taking on student loans, for example, David Segal, "Law Students Lose the Grant Game as Schools Win," New York Times, April 2011 and Liz
Goodwin, "Law grads sue sch ool, say degree is 'indentured servitude'," Yahoo ews, August 2011. In a different application for workers, Spinnewijn (2015) an alyzed the impact of overconfidence abo ut job-finding on
optimal unemployment insurance. For work on overoptimism and stock options for nonexecutive workers
see, for example, Oyer and Schaefer (2005).
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